Saturday, July 1, 2017

July 01, 2017 Saturday

Bedtime Story 


Understanding the Essence of ω-inconsistency


Tonight we will consider the idea of ω-inconsistency more formally.

Consider arithmetic predicate ‘P’.

Then a formal calculus C would be ω-inconsistent if it is possible to demonstrate inside the system both these two formulas:

(1) ‘(∃x) P(x)’ which signifies ‘There is some number that has property P’.

(2) Each of the infinite set of formulas ‘~P(0)’, ‘~P(s0)’, ‘~P(s00)’ and so on which signifies, ‘0 does not have the property P’, ‘1 does not have the property P’, ‘2 does not have the property P’ and so on.

I hope that it is almost self-evident to you that satisfying both these conditions are contradictory and thereby making that system inconsistent or rather ω-inconsistent.

On one hand it is asking that some number of the system has a specific property and on the other hand it is stating that each and every possible infinite numbers of the system will lack that property.  
 A brief analysis should make it clear that if C is inconsistent, then it is also ω-inconsistent.

After all, in an inconsistent formal system, all the strings within it are its theorems.

Yet the opposite of it may not necessarily be always true.

That means C can be ω-inconsistent without being inconsistent.

In which case, not only ‘(∃x) P(x)’ may be a theorem of C but also all the other infinite set of formulas would be theorem of C and ‘~(∃x) P(x)’ would not be theorem of C.

Such a scenario would allow C to be ω-inconsistent without being inconsistent (which was proved by Gödel for his theorems).

At first glance, it may seem contradictory for all the other infinite set of formulas (‘~P(0)’, ‘~P(s0)’ etc.) to be theorem of C and ‘~(∃x) P(x)’ to be not.

After all, the whole family of formulas collectively says that there is no number with the property P, whereas 
‘~(∃x) P(x)’ singly says that no number has property P.

Does it not make sense for the second formula to follow directly from the first assertion?

And in that case, how can the formula ‘(∃x) P(x)’ which says that some number has property P, be a theorem?

Does it not, in that case, clearly contradict the assertion of the family of formulas?

You see mon ami, both these concerns are justified if you are a human ape and take meanings into consideration.

But C is a system of formal calculus, where meanings have no role to play.

What holds paramount are the rules of inference.

The concerns would be justified if there were to be one rule that could encompass the entire family of formulas into account.

That would have been possible if the formulas in the family were finite.

But being infinite, no single rule can hold true for infinite number of formulas.

You would recall how David Hilbert insisted on finitistic arithmetic in his program.

And so, the situation that has arisen here may seem very strange, it is still both possible and valid.

That is all that I will say about ω-inconsistency.

Stay tuned to the voice of an average story storytelling chimpanzee or login at http://panarrans.blogspot.in/
                              
Good night mon ami and my fellow cousin ape.
                           
  
                

             












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Another great educator and a teacher that I am aware of is Professor Subhashish Chattopadhyay in Bangalore, India.

While I narrate stories, Professor Subhashish an electronic engineer and a former professor at BARC, does and teaches real mathematics and physics.

He started the participation of Indian students at the International Physics Olympiad.

Do visit him here:


All his books can be downloaded for free through this link:


For edutainment and English education of your children, I recommend this large collection of Halloween Songs for Kids:

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCd14DRdYKj454znayUIfcAg

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